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Abstract
Fuzzy techniques – techniques designed to convert imprecise human
knowledge into precise computer-understandable terms – have many successful applications. Traditional applications of fuzzy techniques use only
important general features of human reasoning and, to make an implement more efficient, ignore subtle details, details which are not important
for the corresponding application. But from the more fundamental viewpoint, it is desirable to understand, in all the detail, how people actually
reason. In this paper, we use general ideas of fuzzy approach to answer
this question. Interestingly – and somewhat unexpectedly – the resulting analysis leads to a natural explanation of existence of several distinct
levels of certainty and to a natural appearance of quantum-like negative
degrees of certainty.

1

Why Study Generic “And”- and “Or”Operations

“And”- and “or”-operations. Expert knowledge is often described by using
imprecise (“fuzzy”) words from natural languages such as “small’. To be able
to use this knowledge in computer-based decision making, it is necessary to
describe this knowledge in computer-understandable language. Computers have
1

been originally designed to process numbers, this is still what they do most
efficiently. So, a natural idea is to describe imprecise expert knowledge by
numbers.
The main idea of such description comes from fuzzy logic (see, e.g., [3, 11,
14, 15, 17, 22]), where for each imprecise property like “small” and for each
possible value x of the corresponding quantity, we ask the expert to mark, on
scale of 0 to 1, his/her degree of certainty that x is small. (Alternatively, we
can use another scale, e.g., a scale from 0 to 10, and then divide the result by
10 to re-scale it to the interval [0, 1].)
The problem is that many expert rules use logical connectives “and”, “or”,
and “not” in their formulation. For example, a medical doctor can say that if a
patient has a strong fever and a heavy headache then a certain medicine should
be prescribed. To describe such rules in numerical form, we need to provide
numerical degree of certainty not just to individual statements like “a patient
has strong fever” and “a patient has a heavy headache”, but also to logical
combinations of these statements.
In the ideal world, we should ask the expert to estimate his/her degree of
confidence in all possible logical combinations. However, the number of all such
possible combinations is astronomical, in millions and billions, and there is no
way that we can ask experts about all such combinations. For all other logical
combinations, for which we cannot ask the expert directly, we need to be able to
estimate the expert’s degree of confidence in these statements based on the only
information that we have, i.e., based on the expert-provided degree of confidence
about combined statement.
For “and”, this means that we should have an algorithm that, given the
expert’s degree of confidence a and b in statements A and B, will provide an
estimate for the expert’s degree of confidence in the “and”-combination A & B of
these statements. This algorithm is called an “and”-operation or, for historical
reasons, a t-norm. We will denote the result of applying this algorithm by
f& (a, b).
Similarly, for “or”, this means that we should have an algorithm that, given
the expert’s degree of confidence a and b in statements A and B, will provide
an estimate for the expert’s degree of confidence in the “or”-combination A ∨ B
of these statements. This algorithm is called an “or”-operation or, for historical
reasons, a t-conorm. We will denote the result of this algorithm by f∨ (a, b).
What “and”- and “or”-operations are currently used in computerbased decision making. In the first papers that used fuzzy techniques, researchers tried to elicit the “and”- and “or’-operations that best describe actual
human reasoning. However, it turned out that, taking into account that we are
talking about very imprecise expert rules, adding more details to “and”- and
“or”-operations did not add much to the quality of the resulting decisions and
controls – while requiring a lot of time to elicit these operations and additional
computation time to implement them in the actual decision-making procedures.
As a result, researchers realized that from the application viewpoint, it is usually sufficient to limit ourselves to simple operations like f& (a, b) = min(a, b) or
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f& (a, b) = a · b, and leave the study of the actual “and”- and “or”-operations to
psychologists and linguists.
So what about the actual “and”- and “or”-operations: formulation
of the problem. In this paper, we go back to the original idea of eliciting
the actual “and”- and “or”-operations from the experts, with the purpose of
analyzing what the analysis of such actual operations can tell us about human
knowledge processing.

2

Analysis of the Problem

What are actual “and”- and “or”-operations? Empirical study of the actual human reasoning consistently shows that this reasoning is very complicated
and very individualized. In particular, it is known that the actual “and”- and
“or”-operations are complicated, and differ from one application area to another
– and even from one person to another. This was shown, e.g., when the designers of one of the world’s first expert systems MYCIN (see, e.g., [9]), who spent
a lot of time and effort to find the “and”- and “or”-operations most appropriate
for medical reasoning tried to apply the same operations to geophysics. It was
immediately discovered that geophysicists think differently, and this difference
makes perfect sense:
 a medical doctor has to be very cautious, and only recommend a surgery
or other major intervention when he/she is reasonably confident that this
intervention will help, while
 a company prospecting for oil usually starts exploring even if there is a
remaining doubt that there is oil in this area: if they wait for additional
experiments that would enable them to get a perfect confidence, competitors would have gone ahead of them.

In all these cases, simple – or even more complex – “and”- and “or”operations are only an approximation to the actual, even more complex ones.
It seems like the more data we gather about the actual human decision making,
the more complex the resulting model becomes. In other words, in the set of
all possible “and”- and “or”-operations, the actual “and”- and “or”-operations
that describe human reasoning are not some simplified elements. In terms of
complexity, they are generic elements of this set.
So, let us study what we can say about such generic operations.
In general, what do we know about generic elements. What do we
mean by saying that some element is a generic element of a set – be it set
of numbers, set of functions, or set of some other objects? In a large set, we
usually have a few elements with unusual properties. For example, in the set of
all people, we have people who are very short, and we have people who are very
tall. Both very short and very tall people are rare, so such people are clearly
not generic. Generic usually means that the corresponding object only has
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important properties that most elements of this set have. When we say “most”,
we mean that there is a natural probability measure on the corresponding set,
and that a object is generic if it has the same properties as random elements in
the sense of this measure.
There are several general results about random elements. In particular,
there is a result by B. Tsirel’son [21] that under reasonable conditions, random
elements are location on the boundary of the corresponding set – or at least
close to this boundary. This general fact requires a complex proof, but it can be
explained on a simple example. Suppose that you are testing a hypothesis that
observations x1 , . . . , xn are independent and normally distributed, with 0 mean
and standard deviation 1. In this case, one of the most widely used tests is the
n
1 X 2
x is smaller than
t-test (see, e.g., [19]), i.e., checking whether the average ·
n i=1 i
a certain threshold tα,n ≈ 1, where α is the corresponding level of confidence.
In such a situation, the set of all observations consistent with this hypothesis
has the form
)
(
n
1 X 2
x ≤ tα,n .
(x1 , . . . , xn ) : ·
n i=1 i
However, according to the Law of Large Numbers, this mean tends to the variance – i.e., in this case, to 1. This means, informally speaking, that for large n,
most observations are concentrated on the border of the above set, i.e., in the
set
(
)
n
1 X 2
(x1 , . . . , xn ) : ·
x ≈1 ,
n i=1 i
for some relevant meaning of approximate equality.
Moreover, if the boundary itself has a kind of a boundary; e.g., the boundary
of a square consists of four sides, and each of the sides has boundaries – vertices
– then random elements are located on this “boundary of boundary”, etc.
What does this general property of generic objects mean for the case
of “and”-operations. In general, an “and”-operation f& (a, b) is a function.
There is a lot of research about random functions. This research started with
Wiener measure (a mathematical description of Brownian motion), a description
of functions of one variable. Still, most of the research now is about random
functions of one variable – what is called random processes. There is research on
random functions of two or more variables – known as random fields – but much
less is done for them. Since an “and”-operation is a function of two variables,
a natural idea is to look for related functions of one variable – so that more
known results will be available.
A natural way to form a function of one variables is to consider the case
def
when a = b, in this case we have a function f (a) = f& (a, a). In general, the
natural limitations on possible “and”-operations f& (a, b) are:
 that this operation coincides with the usual “and”-operation when we
know for sure whether each of the statements is true (1) or false (0), i.e.,
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f& (0, 0) = f& (0, 1) = f& (1, 0) = 0 and f& (1, 1) = 1;
 that a person’s degree of confidence f& (a, b) in A & B is the same as this
person’s degree of confidence f& (b, a) in B & A: f& (a, b) = f& (b, a);
 that a person’s degree of confidence f& (a, b) in A & B cannot exceed
his/her degree of confidence in A or in B: f& (a, b) ≤ a and f& (a, b) ≤ b;
and
 that if the person becomes more confident in A and/or in B, then his/her
degree of confidence in A & B will either increase or remain the same, but
it cannot decrease: if a ≤ a′ and b ≤ b′ , then f& (a, b) ≤ f& (a′ , b′ ).

In relation to our function F (a) = f& (a, a), this means that F (0) = 0, F (1) = 1,
F (a) ≤ a, and that if a < a′ , then F (a) ≤ F (a′ ).
In general, for a set determined by inequalities, its boundary is where some
of these inequalities become equalities. For example, for an interval
[0, 1] = {x : 0 ≤ x & x ≤ 1}
its boundary consists of the points in which one of these two inequalities 0 ≤ x
or x ≤ 1 becomes equalities, i.e., when either x = 0 or x = 1.
Similarly, for the square
{(x, y) : 0 ≤ x & x ≤ 1 & 0 ≤ y & y ≤ 1},
the boundary consists of four sides: the side where x = 0, the side where x = 1,
the side where y = 0, and the side where y = 1.
In our case, this means that on the boundary, some of the inequalities become
equalities, i.e., that we must have F (a) = a for some a ∈ (0, 1) and/or that we
must have F (a) = F (a′ ) for some a < a′ .
From this viewpoint, “boundary of boundary” corresponds to a situation
when many inequalities become equalities, i.e., in particular, that we have
F (a) = a for several values a ∈ (0, 1).
Which “and”-operations have these properties? To answer this question, let us recall that there is a known general description of all possible
“and”-operations; see, e.g., [3, 11, 14, 15, 17]. This description starts with
describing so-called Archimedean “and”-operations, i.e., operations for which
either f& (a, b) = f −1 (f (a) · f (b)) for some strictly monotonic function f (a) or
f& (a, b) = f −1 (max(f (a) + f (b) − 1, 0)). For each of these operations, for all
a ∈ (0, 1), we have f& (a, a) < a.
To describe a general “and”-operation, on the interval [0, 1], we select several
intervals Ii = [ai , ai ] whose interiors do not intersect. On each of these intervals,
the “and”-operation is isomorphic to an Archimedean one, and in all other
cases – i.e., when a and b do not belong to the same interval Ii – we have
f& (a, b) = min(a, b). In this arrangement, the equality F (a) = a is satisfied if
and only if the point a is one of the following two types:
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 it is either an endpoint ai or ai of one of the selected intervals,
 or this point a does not belong to any of the selected intervals Ii at all.

So, we can conclude that in the actual generic “and”-operation, there are most
probably several such intervals Ii and maybe an area that does not belong to
any of these intervals.
This may sound as a somewhat unexpected conclusion, since in the usual
pragmatic approach to fuzzy logic, such weird general “and”-operations are
viewed as practically useless purely mathematical constructions – to the extent
that many textbooks on fuzzy techniques do not even mention such operations or
mention them in passing. What we showed is that these seemingly exotic overcomplicated operations are the ones that describe the actual human reasoning!
OK, interesting mathematics, but so what? At first glance, our excitement sounds unjustified: OK, we have some interesting mathematical construction, but the goal of fuzzy techniques is to describe human reasoning. What
can this mathematical construction tell us about human reasoning? Let us try
to answer this question.

3

First Consequence: Levels of Certainty Naturally Appear

Usual continuous approach to certainty vs. the existence of levels of
certainty: a seeming contradiction. In the traditional fuzzy logic, certainty
is described by a number from the interval [0, 1]. Alternative, we can use a
probabilistic approach to describing uncertainty, in which case certainty of a
statement can be described by the probability that this statement is true –
and this probability is also a number from the same interval [0, 1]. In both
approaches, we have a continuous scale and, thus, a continuous transition from
less certain statements to more certain one. In general, if we use, e.g., the usual
product “and”-operation f& (a, b) = a · b, then, even if we start with several
highly confidence statements with a = b = . . . = c = 0.99, then, by combining
these statements, we can get statement A B & . . . & C whose degree of certainty
is as close to 0 as we want.
In reality, however, practical uncertainties fall into several clearly distinct
levels. On the top, there is mathematical level, where we only consider absolutely correct, rigorously proved statements. Next is the level of reasoning
in physics, where we can often make conclusions without rigorously proving
existence, continuity, or differentiability – as long as the resulting predictions
make physical sense. This is not just because of lack of mathematical ingenuity
and the resulting inability to prove the corresponding existence – the situation
is much more complex: e.g., in general quantum field theory, there is still no
consistent precise mathematical description (not to mention quantum gravity
and other similar phenomena); see, e.g., [10, 20]. There are some mathematical
6

formulas, but it is known that in some cases, they lead to physically useless
infinite values for appropriate quantities.
Then there is a level of other natural sciences like geo- or biosciences, where
there is even fewer rigor – and thus, fewer certainty, etc. Once we assign a numerical value describing our degree of certainty in each statement, each level can
be described by the range [d, d] of acceptable degrees of uncertainty. Everything
mathematician do should have to satisfy some minimal certainty requirements,
and the same is true for physicists – mathematicians may make fun of the physicists’ non-perfectly-strict conclusions, but there is a certain high level of rigor
that a physical paper must satisfy.
We just mentioned the main levels of certainty, but within each level, there
are sub-levels. For example, in mathematics, there is a level of constructive
mathematics (seem, e.g., [1, 2, 4, 5, 7, 8, 12, 13, 18]) when the statement ∃x P (x)
that there exists an object x satisfying a property P (x) is considered proven
only if we have an algorithm that effectively constructs such an object. Another
sublevel is when, in principle, we allow non-algorithmic constructions but do
not allow Axiom of Choice, etc.
The interesting thing about each level (and sub-level) of certainty is that, in
contrast to the above example of the product “and”-operation on the interval
[0, 1], each level is self-sufficient: mathematicians only use mathematical level
of certainty, physicists only use physical level of certainty, etc. In other words,
any “and”-combination of statements from the same level belongs to this same
level. If we have statement A, B, . . . , C from some level, for which the degrees
of certainty are at least as high as the minimum d acceptable at this level, then
our degree of certainty in the combines statement A & B & . . . & C cannot get
lower than this level d > 0.
So, at first glance, there seems to be contradiction between the usual fuzzy
description of uncertainty and the observed existence of clearly distinct levels
of certainty.
But is there a contradiction? Let us show that the seeming contradiction
comes not from the essence of fuzzy logic, but from the fact that we are using
a simplified example of an “and”-operation – and that for the actual, more
complex “and”-operation, not only there is no contradiction, but the existence
of layers naturally follows.
Indeed, according to the general description of “and”-operations, for any two
values v < v ′ for which F (v) = f& (v, v) = v and F (v ′ ) = f& (v ′ , v ′ ) = v ′ – and,
as we mentioned, such levels exist for the actual “and”-operation – if we have
any two statements A and B with degrees of certainty a and b from the interval
[v, v ′ ], then the degree of certainty f& (a, b) in the statement A & B also belongs
to the same interval. So, for the actual “and”-operation, the values v for which
F (v) = v naturally divide the whole range [0, 1] of possible values of degree of
certainty into sub-ranges [d, d] which are self-sufficient – in the sense that:
 if we have statement A, B, . . . , C from this sub-range,
 then our degree of certainty in the combines statement A & B & . . . & C
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also belongs to this sub-range.
In other words, levels of certainty indeed naturally appear.

4

Below 0 and Above 1?

What about the future? In the previous section, we talked about the current
situation. A natural question is: how will it evolve? To answer this question,
let us recall what we usually interpret as levels 0 and 1, and what happened
with the corresponding levels of certainty in the past.
What do we choose as levels 0 and 1? Naturally, we identify 1 with the
level which, at present, corresponds to the largest degree of certainty, and 0
with the level that corresponds to the lowest possible degree of certainty.
Resulting problem. This sounds reasonable but the problem is that, historically, new levels appear all the time – and will probably appear again. For
example, the current mathematical level of rigor appeared, it is final form, only
in the 19 century, with the “revolution of rigor” that lead to formal definitions
of continuity, limits, etc.; see, e.g., [6]. Constructive mathematics – one of the
highest level of rigor – appeared only in the 20th century.
Negative and larger-than-1 degrees naturally appear. It is natural to
expect that new even higher levels of certainty will appear in the future. How
will we be able to describe them – taking into account that the degree 1 is already
taken by some level which is lower than this forthcoming one? Naturally, we
will end up with degree of certainty which are higher than 1 – and, similarly,
degree of certainty which are lower than 0. In the probabilistic approach, this
would mean having subjective probabilities smaller than 0 or larger than 1.
Can this be related to quantum computing? Such negative and largerthan-1 subjective probabilities may provide a new interpretation for negative
value in quantum physics [10, 20] – and especially in quantum computing [16],
where, in contrast to the general quantum physics that uses general complex
numbers a + b · i, only real numbers are used. In this case, real numbers from the
interval [0, 1] can be, in principle, interpreted in the usual probabilistic sense, so
all that remains is to interpret numbers which are smaller than 0 and numbers
which are larger than 1 – and this is exactly what actual fuzzy operations
provide.
On the qualitative level, this interpretation makes sense. Indeed, as we have
mentioned, both negative values and values which are larger than 1 correspond
to future knowledge. Naturally, if we use some elements of future knowledge in
our computations, this can make computations faster – this may explain why
many quantum computing algorithms are indeed faster and more efficient than
the corresponding non-quantum ones: e.g., the well-known Grover’s quatum
algorithm
can find an element with the desired property in a n-element list
√
in n computations steps, which a similar non-quantum algorithm requires at
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least n steps which is much longer: e.g., for n =1,000,000, it is 1,000 times
longer.
Instead of a conclusion: reminder. And all this – explaining levels of
certainty, relating to quantum algorithms – naturally follows from the analysis
of the actual “and”-operations!
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